We examine the expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in a standard New Keynesian model in which private agents refer to the central bank's forecast in the process of adaptive learning. In this environment, to satisfy the E-stability condition, the central bank must respond more strongly to the expected inflation rate than the so-called Taylor principle suggests. On the other hand, the central bank's strong reaction to the expected inflation rate raises the possibility of indeterminacy of the REE. In considering these problems, a robust policy is to respond to the current inflation rate to a certain degree.
Introduction
Since the development of adaptive learning in macroeconomics, many studies have investigated the expectational stability (E-stability) conditions of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in various macroeconomic models (Evans and Honkapohja (2001) ). One of the important applications to monetary economics is provided by Bullard and Mitra (2002) .
They examine the E-stability condition in a simple class of the New Keynesian model, which consists of an IS equation, a New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), and a Taylortype monetary policy rule. 1 Their results indicate that the so-called Taylor principle, which requires the central bank to adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one with the inflation rate, corresponds to the E-stability condition under some versions of Taylortype monetary policy rules, including a forward-looking rule incorporating the expectations for the future inflation rate and output gap, which are assumed to be homogeneous between the central bank and private agents. 2 Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) extend the analysis of Bullard and Mitra (2002) to introduce heterogeneous expectations between the central bank and private agents. They show that, even if the central bank and private agents initially have different expectations, the correspondence between the E-stability condition and the Taylor principle holds, as long as the learning algorithms used by these two agents are asymptotically identical. However, they further show that, if the difference of learning algorithms remains even in the long run, the Taylor principle does not generally correspond to the E-stability condition. Therefore, 1 Honkapohja (2003a, 2008) review the studies of adaptive learning in New Keynesian models. 2 The issue of stability under learning when the central bank introduces an interest-rate rule is originally raised by Howitt (1992) in an IS-LM model with a New Classical Phillips curve.
their analysis points out that heterogeneity between the central bank and private agents is a key issue for determining the E-stability condition in a standard New Keynesian model.
However, we can view that the environments of these previous studies are still quite simple because the studies assume that the central bank and private agents homogeneously (or simultaneously) engage in adaptive learning. In other words, the previous studies assume that there is no interaction in the learning process of the central bank and private agents. Of course, as Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) noted, this assumption is introduced as a natural benchmark. 3 However, the validity of this assumption is empirically arguable when we take into account possible interactions between the central bank and private agents.
Especially, in recent years, many central banks have published the forecasts of future economic development in order to enhance the transparency and accountability of monetary policy-making. In this environment, if private agents consider that the central bank's forecast is reliable, it is possible that private agents will use the information from the central bank's forecast in making their forecast. Actually, Fujiwara (2005) provides empirical evidence that, in Japan's survey data, the central bank's forecast significantly influences the forecast of private agents (not vice versa). Therefore, his results present a possibility that the central bank is the leader and private agents are the followers of expectation 3 Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) stated that, "We will focus on the situation in which both the private sector and the central bank use their own forecasts in their decision-making and the forecasts are not available to the other agents. Consequently, the forecasts have no strategic role. This case can be seen as a natural benchmark."
formations. 4 In this study, we examine the E-stability of the REE in a standard New Keynesian model in which the central bank is the leader and private agents are the followers of expectation formations. This means that private agents refer to the central bank's forecast in the process of adaptive learning. This kind of leader-follower relationship of adaptive learning has already been introduced by Granato, Guse, and Wong (2007) in the traditional "cobweb" model. However, their analysis investigates heterogeneous expectations among private agents. In contrast, the distinctive feature of our study is that it investigates heterogeneous expectations between the policymaker (namely, the central bank) and private agents.
As we assume that private agents refer to the central bank's forecast, our study introduces heterogeneity concerning the perceived law of motion (PLM) used by the central bank and private agents. However, as for the learning algorithm, we assume that both the central bank and private agents use recursive least squares (RLS) with decreasing gain, which is the most standard algorithm in the literature. 5 In these respects, the environment of our study contrasts sharply with that of Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) , which assumes 4 Fujiwara (2005) suggests, "In the learning context, it would be better to suppose that the central bank is a leader rather than a follower when analyzing monetary policy in Japan, since the results in this paper indicate that professional forecasters tend to learn from the central bank rather than to influence it (Fujiwara 2005, p. 261)." 5 An alternative algorithm is RLS with constant gain, which is typically used to describe a situation in which agents take account of the possibility of structural changes (as is explained by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) that PLMs are homogeneous and that the learning algorithms are heterogeneous.
In this study, we restrict our attention to a Taylor-type simple monetary policy rule. In this sense, our study is distinct from the studies which examine the E-stability under optimal monetary policy, such as Honkapohja (2003b, 2006) . In a recent study, Preston (2008) examines a situation in which the central bank and private agents have different expectations since they have different knowledge on the economic structure. Although the environment of his study is somewhat similar to ours, his study introduces a targeting rule, rather than simple Taylor-type rule. 6 In addition, his study does not examine the issue of interactions between the central bank's forecast and private agents' expectations. 7 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our framework.
In addition, by using this framework, we confirm that, if the central bank and private agents are homogeneously learning, the E-stability condition corresponds to the Taylor principle, as reported by Bullard and Mitra (2002) . In Section 3, we examine the E-stability condition when private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. In Section 4, we investigate the relationship between the E-stability and the determinacy (uniqueness) of the REE. In Section 5, we provide some further analysis. In Section 6, we conclude our analysis. 6 As a result, in his framework, the central bank responds to private agents' expectation, rather than to the central bank's internal forecast. 7 Furthermore, his model introduces private agents' long-horizon forecast, rather than one-periodahead forecast, following Preston (2005).
Framework

Model
Our study is based on the standard New Keynesian model, which is used by Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) . It consists of three equations, which are the IS equation, the NKPC, and a forward-looking monetary policy rule.
The IS equation and the NKPC are given as follows:
where x t is the output gap, π t is the inflation rate, r t is the nominal interest rate, and r n t is the natural rate of real interest. Each variable is defined as the deviation from its steady state. In particular, r t is the deviation of the nominal interest rate from its steady-state level, which is consistent with zero inflation and steady-state output growth. E P t denotes private agents' subjective (possibly nonrational) expectation. σ, β, and κ are the structural parameters which satisfy σ > 0, 1 ≥ β > 0, and κ > 0.
The process of natural rate of real interest is given by
where ρ satisfies 1 > ρ > 0 and ε t follows i.i.d. with zero mean.
The central bank introduces a forward-looking monetary policy rule:
where φ π is the responsiveness to the expected inflation rate and φ x is the responsiveness to the expected output gap. σ. Therefore, in Section 6, we numerically investigate the robustness of our main results without imposing the assumptions on the central bank's precise knowledge on these aspects.
When we introduce the above restrictions in monetary policy rule (4), the model, which consists of (1), (2) and (4), can be reduced to the univariate model of inflation dynamics:
where A = 0, B = κσ + β, C = −κσφ π , and D = κσ.
E-stability under Homogeneous Learning
Before moving on to our main analysis, we present the E-stability condition of the REE in the benchmark situation where the central bank and private agents use homogeneous procedure of adaptive learning. As usual in the literature, we assume that the PLM used by central bank and private agents has the following form:
where e a and e b are coefficients, which are updated in every period. Since the functional form of (6) corresponds to the minimal state variables (MSV) solution of the system (5), we call the learning process of (6) "MSV learning." 8 Based on PLM, the one-period-ahead expectation is calculated as follows:
By substituting (7) into (5), we derive the actual law of motion (ALM) as follows:
From (6) and (8), the mapping functions (T-maps) from PLM to ALM are as follows:
The REE with the MSV form (MSV solution) is obtained as the fixed point of T-maps.
The parameters of the MSV solution (a and b) are computed as follows:
Note that the combination of a and b is unique. It means that, if we restrict attention to the MSV form, the solution is unique, regardless of the values of structural parameters.
For the moment (except for Section 4), we focus on the MSV solution.
In this study, we assume that both the central bank and private agents use RLS with decreasing gain. Then, the E-stability of the REE is defined as the local asymptotic stability 8 See McCallum (1983) for the details of MSV solution.
of the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) associated with the T-maps ( (9) and (10)):
where τ is "notional" or "artificial" time.
From these ODEs, the E-stability condition is derived as two inequalities:
Since 1 > ρ > 0, (14) holds if (13) holds. Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for the E-stability of the REE is (13) . (13) is rewritten as follows:
(15) requires that the responsiveness to the expected inflation rate is strictly larger than some threshold value (1 + β−1 κσ ). This result can be viewed as a special case of the results of Bullard and Mitra (2002) , which shows that, in the absence of restrictions in monetary policy rule (4), the necessary and sufficient condition for the E-stability of the REE is given by the so-called Taylor principle, which is expressed as φ π + 1−β κ φ x > 1. In our framework, the Taylor principle corresponds to (15), since we have imposed the restriction of φ x = σ −1 . Therefore, the result indicates that the Taylor principle is the necessary and sufficient condition for the E-stability of the REE even if we introduce the restrictions in monetary policy rule (4).
E-stability under Learning from the Central Bank's Forecast
Basic Assumptions
In this section, we examine the E-stability condition when private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. In order to set up the environment, we introduce five basic assumptions.
First, we assume that private agents cannot observe the natural rate of real interest, although the central bank can observe it. This assumption implies that it is very hard, or very costly, for an individual private agent to observe directly the state of the aggregate economy, although the central bank can observe it by using many internal research resources. 
Learning from the Central Bank's Forecast
Based on the basic assumptions, we introduce the following setup for the learning mechanisms of the central bank and private agents. We assume that, as in the previous section, the central bank is MSV learning. Then, the central bank's PLM is as follows:
At the beginning of period t, the central bank updates the parameters of e a and e b by using the data of period t − 1 (y t−1 and r n t−1 ). Then, the central bank observes the realization of the natural rate of real interest at period t (r nthe historical performance of the central bank's forecast. Specifically, we assume that private agents estimate the following PLM:
By estimating (18) with RLS, private agents assess the historical performance of the central bank's forecast. 9 If the forecast has historically performed well, the constant term e c approximates zero, and the slope e d should be close to unity. In contrast, if the central bank's forecast has performed poorly, e c approximates the sample average of π t , and e d should be close to zero.
Private agents update the parameters of e c and e d by using the data of period t − 1 (π t−1 and E CB t−2 π t−1 ). Since private agents are the followers, they can use the central bank's forecast E CB t π t+1 in forming their expectations at period t (E P t π t+1 ). To calculate E P t π t+1 , private agents use their evaluation of the performance of the central bank's forecast as follows: (19) indicates that the forecast of private agents is influenced by the central bank's forecast. As we can see, the impact of the central bank's forecast on private agents' forecast is determined by the estimated parameter e d. Therefore, (19) illustrates a situation in which private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast, depending on its historical performance.
By inserting both agents' expectations ( (17) and (19)) into the system of (5), we derive ALM for π t as follows:
Equilibrium
Next, we derive the T-maps from PLM to ALM. From (16) and (20), the T-maps about parameters of e a and e b are given as follows:
T a (e a) = A + B(e c + e de a) + Ce a,
Since private agents' PLM (18) is not the MSV form, we must derive the T-maps from the relevant orthogonality conditions. 10 From (17) and (18), private agents' "projected"
ALM is defined as follows:
The corresponding orthogonality conditions are given by
E h (e a + ρ e br n t−1 )
In order to calculate T c and T d , we substitute (20) into (24) and (25) . Then, by solving (24) and (25), we obtain the following expressions of T c and T d :
The equilibrium is derived as the fixed points of the T-maps ( (21), (22), (26), and (27)).
The coefficients at the equilibrium are given as follows:
10 See Branch (2004) for the derivation of T-maps using orthogonality conditions.
Note that, at the equilibrium, (19) becomes as follows:
Therefore, at the equilibrium, expectations are homogeneous between the central bank and private agents. Furthermore, these expectations are the same as the expectation at the MSV solution in Section 2. Therefore, the expectations of (28) are the rational expectations and this equilibrium is the REE. This means that the economic dynamics at equilibrium are exactly the same in the two cases: (i) the case in which the central bank and private agents are homogeneously learning and (ii) the case in which private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. However, as the analysis in the next subsection shows, the E-stability conditions of the REE can differ between these two cases.
E-stability
The E-stability of the equilibrium is the local asymptotic stability of ODEs associated with the T-maps of (21), (22) , (26), and (27). Although these T-maps are interdependent,
and T d ( e d) only depend on e b and e d. Therefore, we can examine the stability of e b and e d, independently of the stability of e a and e c.
To examine the stability of e b and e d, we define the ODEs associated with the T-maps of e b and e d ( (22) and (27)) as follows:
Given the convergence of e b and e d, we can examine the stability of e a and e c by using the following ODEs: 
We derive the E-stability condition as the necessary and sufficient condition for the ODEs of (29) and (30) to be locally asymptotically stable around the REE. The result is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the central bank is MSV learning and all private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. Then, the REE of (5) is E-stable if and only if (31) and (32) hold.
Furthermore, suppose that κσ > 1 − β holds. Then, the REE of (5) is E-stable if and only if (31) holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since β is close to unity, κσ > 1 − β holds for a wide range of parameter sets (κ and σ).
Then, the Taylor principle, which is expressed as (32), is not a sufficient condition for the E-stability. Alternatively, the necessary and sufficient condition for the E-stability is given by (31). This means that, to satisfy the E-stability condition, the central bank must adjust the nominal interest rate by more than double the rise of central bank's expected inflation rate.
Thus, the E-stability condition in this situation is quite different from the condition in the benchmark case analyzed in Section 2. Although the equilibrium dynamics of these two cases are identical, the E-stability condition is severer in the environment of this section.
This means that, if private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast, the central bank must respond to the expected inflation rate more strongly than the Taylor principle suggests.
The basic intuition about the result arises from the fact that, in the situation of this However, this could be regarded as an extreme case. 11 In this subsection, therefore, we consider a more realistic environment in which some private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast.
Suppose that a proportion µ of private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast (1 ≥ µ ≥ 0). The remaining 1 − µ of private agents are MSV learning. Denote
as the forecast of the former private agents and E P 2 t π t+1 as the forecast of the latter private agents. Note that the forecast made by the latter is just the same as the central bank's forecast. Therefore, the aggregate forecast of private agents (E P t π t+1 ) can be expressed as follows: 12 11 In this respect, Kohn (2005) These include (i) the identical expectations at steady state, (ii) some linearity properties of expectations, and (iii) the law of iterated expectations at both an individual and aggregate level. We assume that all of these assumptions are satisfied.
By substituting (33) into (5), we obtain the following ALM:
where b B = µB and b C = (1 − µ)B + C.
(34) has the same form as (5) . Therefore, in order to examine the E-stability of the REE, we can follow the same steps of the subsections 3.3 and 3.4, by replacing the matrices of B and C with b B and b C. Then, the result for the E-stability of the REE is given by the following proposition. 13 Proposition 2 Suppose that the central bank and a proportion 1 − µ of private agents are MSV learning. In addition, suppose that a proportion µ of private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. Then, the REE of (5) is E-stable if and only if (35) and (36) hold.
Furthermore, suppose that µ ≥ (κσ + β) −1 holds. Then, the REE of (5) is E-stable if and only if (35) holds. In contrast, if µ < (κσ + β) −1 , the REE of (5) is E-stable if and only if (36) holds.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus, if µ is relatively low, then the Taylor principle is the necessary and sufficient condition for the E-stability. 14 However, if µ is relatively high, to ensure the convergence to the REE, the central bank must respond more strongly to the expected inflation rate than the Taylor principle suggests. 13 We can easily find that the equilibrium of (34) is just the same as the REE of (5). 14 Note that, for a wide range of parameter sets, the value of (κσ + β) −1 is between 0 to 1, since β is almost unity.
In the previous sections, we have examined the E-stability condition of the REE. However, in the standard analysis, the condition for the determinacy (uniqueness) of the REE is also regarded as the minimum criterion which should be satisfied in monetary policy rules.
In this regard, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) point out that the issue of determinacy is especially relevant when the central bank introduces a forward-looking monetary policy rule, such as (4). The reason why the determinacy condition has not been examined in the previous sections is that we have restricted our attention to the MSV solution, which is unique in our model. However, if we broaden our scope to introduce the solution forms other than the MSV form (i.e., sunspot equilibria), we must examine the condition for determinacy of the REE. 15 In particular, we must investigate the relationship between the determinacy condition and the E-stability condition. In this section, we examine this issue.
Determinacy of the REE
The determinacy condition is presented by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) . Since the system is reduced as the univariate model of (5), the derivation of determinacy condition is easy.
In the REE, the system of (5) is rewritten as follows:
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) show the determinacy condition of (37) as |B + C| < 1. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3
The economy of (5) has a unique REE if and only if the following condition holds:
Thus, the determinacy condition sets the upper bound of φ π . This result means that the central bank should not respond to the expected inflation rate very strongly, because such a strong response causes the emergence of sunspot equilibria. This is the issue raised by Bernanke and Woodford (1997).
Relationship between Determinacy and E-stability
Next, we examine the relationship between the determinacy condition and the E-stability condition. Specifically, we investigate a situation in which all private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. 16 In this case, the E-stability condition is given by Proposition 1. By combining these with Proposition 3, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the central bank is MSV learning and all private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. Then, the following statements hold.
(i) If 1 > β +κσ, the necessary and sufficient condition for the REE of (5) to be E-stable and determinate is given by 16 The extension to the situation in which some private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast is straightforward.
(ii) If 3 ≥ β + κσ ≥ 1, the necessary and sufficient condition for the REE of (5) to be E-stable and determinate is given by
(iii) If β + κσ > 3, the REE of (5) cannot be both E-stable and determinate for any value of φ π .
The condition (39) is the same as the determinacy condition (38). This means that, in the case (i), the determinacy condition is a sufficient condition for the E-stability of the REE. However, this is a relatively special case, because β + κσ is usually more than unity (since β is close to unity).
Therefore, for a wide range of the parameter sets, the determinacy is not a sufficient condition for the E-stability of the REE. This is an important finding in the literature, Since β +κσ is usually greater than unity, the cases of (ii) and (iii) deserve our attention.
In the case (ii), the region of E-stable and determinate REE is narrow. This means that the central bank's choice of the value φ π is highly restrictive. The environment of the case (iii) is even severer, because the central bank cannot simultaneously satisfy the conditions of determinacy and E-stability. In the case (iii), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the central bank is MSV learning and all private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. Then, under the condition of β + κσ ≥ 3, the following statements hold.
(i) The REE of (5) is E-stable and indeterminate if
(ii) The REE of (5) is E-unstable and determinate if
(iii) The REE of (5) is E-unstable and indeterminate if
Thus, if β + κσ > 3, the central bank must choose either the determinacy or the E-stability. If the monetary policy rule satisfies (41), then the E-stable sunspot equilibria emerge. This is the situation investigated by Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) . In this case, the central bank's strong reaction to the expected inflation rate guarantees the Estability. However, the endogenous fluctuations can occur, because multiple REE satisfy the E-stability. Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) recommend that the monetary policy rule that the existence of information delays is a key to the discrepancy between the determinacy and the E-stability of REE.
should rule out this possibility. However, if the central bank avoids the emergence of Estable sunspot equilibria, the REE must be E-unstable. In this sense, the central bank faces a serious trade-off.
In sum, the results indicate that, if private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast, the central bank's policymaking must be more restrictive than in the benchmark case in which both the central bank and private agents engage in homogeneous learning procedure. This means that, if the central bank is the leader of expectation formation, a forward-looking monetary policy rule has more serious problems than those pointed out in
Bernanke and Woodford (1997).
A Remedy
As in the previous subsection, we find that a forward-looking policy rule has serious problems when private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. A possible remedy for this problem is that the central bank additionally introduces the contemporaneous data of the inflation rate into a policy rule. Suppose that the central bank introduces the following monetary policy rule:
where γ is the responsiveness to the contemporaneous data of the inflation rate. Then, the reduced model has the same form of (5). However, the coefficients are replaced by A = 0,
As in Section 4.1, the determinacy condition is obtained as |B + C| < 1. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6
The economy of (1), (2), (3), and (44) has a unique REE if and only if the following condition holds:
Thus, the central bank can relax the determinacy condition by increasing the value of γ. This is a natural consequence because previous studies (including Bullard and Mitra (2002)) have shown that the rule with contemporaneous data is more robust for the determinacy than the rule with forward-looking expectations. By responding to the contemporaneous data of the inflation rate, the central bank can reduce the sensitivity of the economic system to forward-looking expectations. This is why the determinacy is more easily satisfied under rule (44) than (4).
Next, we examine the E-stability condition under rule (44). Suppose that all private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. Then, we can derive the E-stability condition, following the same steps in Section 3. The result is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 7
Suppose that the central bank is MSV learning and all private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. Then, the REE of (1), (2), (3), and (44) is E-stable if and only if (46) and (47) hold.
Thus, the E-stability condition is relaxed by introducing the coefficient γ. By increasing the value of γ, the central bank can easily attain the E-stability of the REE. The reason for this result is explained by the fact that, in the NKPC (3), the contemporaneous inflation rate is determined by private agents' expected inflation rate. Because of this property, the central bank can respond to the forecast errors of private agents, by responding to the contemporaneous data of the inflation rate.
Therefore, the central bank can simultaneously relax the conditions of determinacy and E-stability, by responding to the contemporaneous movements of the inflation rate. This result suggests that a more robust policy strategy for the central bank is to respond to the contemporaneous movements of the inflation rate to a certain degree. 18 
Further Analysis
In this section, we provide two additional analysis. First, we check the robustness of our main results by removing the restrictions on monetary policy rule (4) . Second, we examine the E-stability of REE in the reverse situation in which private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast.
E-stability in the Absence of the Restrictions on Monetary Policy Rule
Until the previous section, we have imposed the restrictions of E CB t x t+1 = E P t x t+1 and φ x = σ −1 on monetary policy rule (4) . These restrictions imply that the central bank has precise knowledge on these aspects. Here, we examine the robustness of our main results 18 Apparently, this policy prescription requires that the central bank can obtain the contemporaneous data of the inflation rate in setting the current interest rate. However, we do not insist that responding to the contemporaneous data of the inflation rate is the sole remedy. For example, introducing the interest rate smoothing into the monetary policy rule will be another possible prescription because previous studies, such as Bullard and Mitra (2007) , point out that it is useful to avoid the problem of indeterminacy of REE.
by removing these restrictions. In particular, we numerically check whether the Taylor principle is sufficient condition for the E-stability of REE even if we do not impose that the central bank has precise knowledge on E P t x t+1 and σ.
In doing so, we restrict our attention to the responsiveness to the expected inflation (φ π ) because our analysis up to the previous section has focused on this parameter. In this regard, we introduce the following monetary policy rule which responds only to the expected inflation rate:
Although this rule imposes another restriction of φ x = 0 in monetary policy rule (4), it does not require the central bank to have any information on private agents' expectation for future output gap and the slope of IS equation. In this sense, the analysis below does not depend on the central bank's precise knowledge on E P t x t+1 and σ.
When we introduce the monetary policy rule (48) into the model which consists of (1) and (2), the model is summarized as the following system:
where
We assume that the central bank's PLM is given as follows:
where e a * = ³ e a * 1 , e a * 2´0 . For simplicity, we assume that the central bank knows the steady state level of output and the inflation rate. Therefore, the PLM does not include constant term. Based on this PLM, the central bank calculates the forward-looking expectations as follows:
All private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. We assume that their PLM is given as follows: Based on the PLM, private agents form their forward-looking expectations as follows:
By substituting (51) and (53) into (49), we obtain the ALM as follows:
To examine the E-stability of equilibrium, we derive the T-maps. From (50) and (54), the T-map about e a is given as follows:
and T a * 2 are given as follows:
From (51) and (52), private agents' projected ALM is given as follows:
The orthogonality conditions are given by E h e a * 1 ρr
E h e a * 2 ρr
From (54) are calculated as follows:
From (56), (57), (61), and (62), the coefficients at the equilibrium (the fixed point of the T-maps) are calculated as follows:
To examine the stability of coefficients, we define the ODEs as follows:
28
The Jacobian of (63) is given as follows:
The E-stability of the REE means that all of the eigenvalues of (64) Here, our question is whether the Taylor principle is a sufficient condition for the Estability of the REE or not. To examine this issue, we set the policy responsiveness to the expected inflation rate as φ π = 1.5. This value satisfies the Taylor principle 19 . Under this parameterization, we calculate the eigenvalues of (64) as 0.0231 ± 0.5173i and −0.4111 ± 0.3678i. Therefore, the E-stability condition is violated even though the value of φ π satisfies the Taylor principle.
Next, we alternatively use the value of φ π = 5.0. Then we calculate the eigenvalues of (64) as −0.0065 ± 0.9994i and −0.5215 ± 0.3002i 20 . Therefore, this result suggests that a 19 Note that, in the case of this subsection, the Taylor principle, which is originally defined as φ π + 1−β κ φ x > 1, corresponds to φ π > 1 since we assume φ x = 0. 20 We have confirmed that all eignvalues are negative in the case of still larger value of φ π . stronger response to the expected inflation rate guarantees the E-stability condition. These results suggest that the Taylor principle is not a sufficient condition for the E-stability when private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast, even if we do not impose the central bank's precise knowledge on E P t x t+1 and σ.
E-stability when the Central Bank is Learning from Private Agents' Forecast
In our main analysis, we have examined the situation in which private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. Readers may be interested in the E-stability condition in the reverse situation in which the central bank is learning from private agents' forecast.
To examine this point, we again impose the restrictions of E CB t x t+1 = E P t x t+1 and φ x = σ −1 on monetary policy rule (4) . In addition, we assume that private agents are the leaders and the central bank is the follower of expectation formation. Furthermore, we assume that private agents are MSV learning and the central bank is learning from private agents' forecast by following the PLM analogous to (18) .
The derivation of the E-stability condition is just the same as in Section 3. Following similar steps, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Suppose that all private agents are MSV learning and the central bank is learning from private agents' forecast. Then, the REE of (5) is E-stable if and only if (15) holds.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Thus, in this reverse situation, the E-stability condition corresponds to the Taylor principle. Intuitively, this result can be interpreted as follows. In this situation, the central bank's forecast errors exceed the forecast errors of private agents. In order to offset private agents' forecast errors, the central bank's reaction to its own forecast need not to be as large as the Taylor principle suggests (i.e. φ π can be smaller than unity). However, to offset the central bank's own forecast errors, the Taylor principle is still required. This is why the E-stability condition is given by the Taylor principle.
Therefore, if private agents are the leaders and the central bank is the follower, the E-stability condition is just the same as in the benchmark case, which is investigated in Section 2. In this environment, the central bank can guarantee both the determinacy and the E-stability of the REE by satisfying the Taylor principle. This implies that the central bank can more easily ensure macroeconomic stability in a case in which the central bank is the follower, rather than the leader of expectation formation.
Conclusion
In this study, we have examined the E-stability of the REE in a standard New Keynesian model in which private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast. More specifically, we have investigated the situation in which private agents introduce the central bank's forecast in their PLM and they determine how to use the forecast information based on their evaluation of the historical performance of the central bank's forecast.
We find that, in contrast to a situation in which both the central bank and private agents homogeneously (or simultaneously) engage in adaptive learning, such as the case of Bullard and Mitra (2002) , the E-stability is not attained solely by the so-called Taylor principle. To ensure convergence to the REE, the central bank must respond more strongly to the expected inflation rate than the Taylor principle suggests.
On the other hand, we show that the central bank's strong reaction to the expected in-flation rate raises the possibility of indeterminacy of the REE, as pointed out by Bernanke and Woodford (1997) . This means that the central bank's policymaking must be more restrictive when the central bank is the leader and private agents are followers in the expectation formation mechanism. In this situation, we find that a robust policy strategy is to respond to the contemporaneous data of the inflation rate to a certain degree because it helps to ensure both of the determinacy and the E-stability of REE.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
If the central bank and a proportion 1 − µ of private agents are MSV learning and a proportion µ of private agents are learning from the central bank's forecast, the relevant characteristic polynomials are given as follows: 
Since 1 > ρ > 0, (B3) holds if (B5) holds. Similarly, (B4) holds if (B6) holds. Therefore, the E-stability condition corresponds to (B5) and (B6).
